2024: A Reflection on a Year of Elections

A British Polling Council: Next Gen Pollsters Event



BPC

Line up:



Part 1 (2:30pm-3:45pm): The UK and US

■ British Election Study Deep-Dive

Professor Jane Green, University of Oxford and President of the British Polling Council

■ GE2024: A London Lens

Jenevieve Treadwell, Policy Fellow (LSE)

■ The US Election

Joe Alder, Research Manager (J.L. Partners)

3:45pm - Tea and coffee break

Part 2 (4:00pm-5:30pm): Insights across the Western World

■ The use of MRP

Cunningham and Anouschka Rajah, Research and Data Analysts (More in Common)

■ A Look at Ireland

Matthew Price, Research Executive (DeltaPoll)

■ Canada Case Study

Rhiannon McQuone, Policy Analyst (Public First)

■ The Rise of the Far-Right

Ruby Cooper, Research Executive (DeltaPoll)





The 2024 UK election What mattered? (First for Votes, then for Seats)

Jane Green, Oxford

What moved votes?











Governing competence (vote intention, 2019-2024)




Party most trusted on economy 1990-2023



Source: Ipsos, with YouGov figures shown in faded colours and dotted lines.


Conservative vote intention, 2020-2023, among 2019 Conservative voters, by Brexit support




The result of this?

Consistent demographic patterns 2017-2019-2024

Vote and age 2015-2024



Vote and education 2015 - 2024




What moved seats?

How did Labour double its majority on 34% of the vote?


Anti-Government Context

- 1. Tactical voting
 - 2. Reform UK
 - 3. Scotland

Vote flows 2019-2024



Vote shares in constituencies Labour gained from Conservatives in England




Double 'anti-government' voting in Scotland

	2019	2021	2024
Approve of both governments	3.33 %	10.1 %	3.77 %
Approve of UK govt, Disapprove of Scottish govt	7.83 %	14.4 %	8.32 %
Approve of Scottish govt, Disapprove of UK govt	52.3 %	57.2 %	29.2 %
Disapprove of both governments	36.5 %	18.3 %	58.7 %

Outcome: record-breaking election!

- Most 'disproportionate'
- Most 'fragmented'
- Lowest ever two-party share
- Most volatile (change between elections)
- Lowest share for any party governing alone
- Almost the lowest ever turnout

Votes to seats ratio, 1945-2024



Was 2024 a success for Labour?

Were Labour just lucky?

Could it all change again quickly?

2024 election explained

- Competence losses drove down Conservative support
- This shifted the tide down, didn't disrupt the 'tribes'
- Age and education are still very important
- Bloc voting helps us understand 2024
- Votes to seats relationship exceptional in this context
 - Tactical voting, especially on 'left-liberal' side
 - Reform took votes from Conservatives, lowered the bar for Labour to win seats (loads on negative swings)
 - Labour benefited from two unpopular govts in Scotland






The 2024 UK election What mattered? (First for Votes, then for Seats)

Jane Green, Oxford





Conservatives never really recovered from 1997





London has become a Labour city









Labour is increasingly efficient in London, the Conservatives are feeling the pinch of FPTP...

Conservative vote and seat share in London, 1983 - 2024



Labour vote and seat share in London, 1983-2024









2024: Who won and by how much?

2024 General Election Results in London by strength of support






The more you have, the more you have to lose...







Who are the second parties? Where are they strongest?

2024 General Election Second Parties by strength of support











A lot of this comes down to values





What do Londoners care about?

Most important issue: London minus the rest of England






Source: More in Common, July 2024

This reflects the issues voters care about

Most important issue






Source: BES Wave 29

Why did London Labour voters vote Labour?

"Why vote Labour?" London




0.0% 5.0% 10.0%15.0%20.0%25.0%30.0%35.0%40.0%

Source: More in Common, July 2024



But we can see a consequence of trying to appeal to a broad coalition

"What are the barriers to voting Labour?" London and the rest of England








Why did London voters vote Conservative?

"where did the conservatives go wrong?" London vs rest

They failed to control immigration
Downing Street parties
They don't respect ordinary people
They got rid of Boris Johnson
They mismanaged the NHS
They failed to 'level up'
They are chaotic
They are corrupt
They are untrustworthy
They backtracked on the environment
Didn't take Britain's challenges seriously
They were divisive not unifying
They haven't built enough
Brexit
Failed to reduce crime and ASB




Source: More in Common, July 2024



Why did London voters vote Reform?

"why vote Reform?" London vs rest

Reform UK's stance on Ukraine
Reform UK's stance on taxes and the economy
Reform UK's stance on the EU
The country needs something new
Nigel Farage would make a good PM
Reform are the most patriotic party
Nigel Farage was quick to get rid of racists
Comments on Sunak and D-Day
Support for my local Reform candidate
Reform pledged to scrap the net zero target
To get the Conservatives out
Nigel Farage is authentic and tells it like it is
The party's stance on immigration






Source: More in Common, July 2024




Central London Tories are much younger than suburban Conservatives



London graduates skew towards Labour


2024 general election vote among degree holders in London and the rest of England






Source: BES Wave 29

Labour has lost their advantage among Asian voters









Source: BES Wave 29

Religion explains a lot of this gap















What just happened?

- Donald Trump won all 7 swing states
- First Republican victory in the popular vote since 2004
- Every state swung towards Trump from 2020


The voters that swung hardest were low propensity and low engagement: young, less highly educated, and non-white

AP VoteCast data




County-level results data tells a similar story

New York Times analysis of county-level results data




Low propensity voters were instrumental to Trump's win

Final J.L. Partners pre-election polling, likely voters



Again, this is supported by county-level results data


J.L. Partners analysis of county-level results data



Low engagement voters were instrumental to Trump's win

Data for Progress pre-election polling, likely voters

How much **attention** do you pay to **news about national politics** on TV, radio, newspapers, and the Internet?



Why?

General theories:

- Issues: lower engagement voters are more likely to prioritise bread and butter issues e.g. cost of living, which became much more salient between 2020 and 2024
- Media landscape: Republicans responded better to rise of nontraditional media, where these voters are particularly likely to be found

Non-general theories:

- Racial depolarisation: Non-white voters shifting right over longer term (e.g., as their voting habits align more closely with their ideology)
- Educational realignment:
 Democrat support becoming concentrated among graduates (e.g., as social issues become more salient)
- Gen Z voters shifting right:
 Possible global trend

What does this mean for polling?

What does this mean for polling?

At J.L. Partners, we:

1. Applied a mixed methods approach (live cell, live landline, text-to-web, online panel, app-based)




2. Ensured a high proportion of low propensity voters (e.g., 17% non-voters from 2020)



3. Cross-referenced self-reported turnout likelihood and voting history to estimate voter likelihood





Panel Questions: The UK and US

- Professor Jane Green University of Oxford and President of the British Polling Council
- Jenevieve Treadwell Policy Fellow (LSE)
 - Joe Alder Research Manager (J.L. Partners)

15th January 2025

BP (SA)

2024: A Reflection on a Year of Elections

A British Polling Council: Next Gen Pollsters Event

Tea break!!

Meet back in 15 minutes

15th January 2025

BPC

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Jenna Cunningham and Anouschka Rajah,
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The use of MRP

Jenna Cunningham, Anouschka Rajah

2024 - an MRP election


Pollsters publishing MRPs in UK General Elections:

2017	2019	2024
YouGov	YouGov FocalData	YouGov FocalData Survation FindOutNow Electoral Calculus Best for Britain We Think Savanta Ipsos Techne JL Partners (SRP) Stonehaven Opinium More in Common

- The 2024 UK General Election introduced the widespread use of MRP across the polling industry.
- In an election in which the winner was easy to predict, 'mega polls' and constituencylevel projections using techniques like MRP garnered continuous media attention.
- This brought both challenges and opportunities.


The challenge

- Traditional voting intention polls are a national estimate based on a representative sample of at least 2,000 people.
- But FPTP means that we are essentially interested in 632 different elections.
- It would be incredibly expensive and time-consuming to run a poll in each constituency.
- And using a uniform swing model, even with the correct vote share, would result in a seat prediction for the Conservatives that was 120 seats off.



The solution - MRP


- 'Multilevel Regression with Post-stratification'
 (MRP) uses data from a larger national voting
 intention poll (at least 10,000 people) to model
 how people will vote based on their
 demographics, voting behaviour and
 information about their constituency.
- The model is then applied to the demographic and electoral makeup of each constituency to make a constituency-level projection.



Process

- Post-stratification frame to weight to, with interlocked constituency demographics
- 2 Collect relevant data on constituencies
- 3 Define model and train on large sample poll
- Use model to predict party vote share for each constituency
- 5 Sanity check

MRP with non-representative data




- Wang et. al. (2015) were the first to use the MRP technique to predict an election outcome.
- They used data from Xbox users which skewed massively young and male - to predict the 2012 US presidential election.
- Key advantages of MRP if data is missing for a certain group (e.g., young women), it will use data from nearby groups (e.g., young men, or older women) to fill in the gaps.

Differing results - data collection

2024 saw a range of MRP estimates because MRP modelling involves making subjective decisions. When it comes to data collection, this includes:

- Source of respondents
- Oversampling
- Question wording




Differing results - handling unknowns

Turnout

Undecided voters

Tactical voting

What difference might tactical voting make?





Differing results - model inputs



• Infinite variables available

Trade offs with computing time

Variable independence / interaction

What now?

- Constituency-level projections throughout this Parliament
- Using MRP modelling for issues other than voting intention
- Open questions around transparency
- The end of MRP?



Jenna Cunningham, jenna@moreincommon.com

Anouschka Rajah anouschka@moreincommon.com





Irish General Election 2024

Matthew Price, Deltapoll

Spot the difference...



Irish general election: Exit poll predicts 'tie' between three main parties

8 February 2020



Tight three-way race in Irish general election, RTÉ exit poll suggests

29 November 2024



What happened?



- The incumbent coalition of Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael won re-election
- Despite mid-cycle dominance, Sinn Féin finished third
- Polls were historically accurate (average error ≈ 0.5pp)
- There were some dubious candidate posters...
- Question: Why did Sinn Féin fail to capitalise?



A three-horse race (and a photo finish)

Polling average between 2020 and 2024 general elections








A (relatively) popular government


The Irish electorate was the most pro-incumbent in Europe




Data: European Election Survey, June 2024



Anxiety about immigration




Immigration's rise; Sinn Féin's decline



Data: Irish Polling Indicator, Ipsos / B&A

Who deserted Sinn Féin?


Lapsed Sinn Féin voters prioritise and oppose immigration more than loyal Sinn Fein voters



Data: NEDS, An Coimisiún Toghcháin, June 2024

An unsustainable electoral coalition

Immigration attitudes of 2020 General Election voters



Data: NEDS, An Coimisiún Toghcháin, June 2024

How Sinn Féin lost it



- An unusually pro-incumbent electoral context
- Ideological fissures exposed as immigration became salient
- Nationalist voters were alienated
- **Lesson:** Some electoral coalitions are single-use



References

- Δ Tom Louwerse and Stefan Müller. 2024. *Irish Polling Indicator Datasets:* Development Version. URL: https://github.com/Irish-Polling-Indicator/ipi-data
- Δ RTÉ News. 2024. *General Election 2024 Live Results*. URL: https://www.rte.ie/news/election-24/results/#/national
- Δ European Election Research Group. 2024. *European Election Study (EES)*. URL: https://www.gesis.org/en/services/finding-and-accessing-data/international-survey-programs/european-election-studies/ees-2024-study
- Δ Irish Times, Ipsos / Behaviour and Attitudes (B&A). 2024. *Snapshot Series*. URL: https://banda.ie/report-series/irish-times-ipsos-ba-snapshot-series/
- Δ An Coimisiún Toghcháin. 2024. *National Election and Democracy Study (NEDS)*. URL: https://www.neds.ie/index.php?page=data
- Δ Rory Costello. 2024. "The impact of immigration on Sinn Féin support in three charts", *Irish Politics Forum*. URL: https://politicalreform.ie/2024/09/09/the-impact-of-immigration-on-sinn-fein-support-in-three-charts/



Cheers for listening

Matthew Price, Deltapoll



Why Canada going to the polls spells t-r-o-u-b-l-e for international students, and d-o-w-n-f-a-l-l for Trudeau

Rhiannon McQuone

32%


of 2024 elections that overturned the incumbent party >80%

of democracies that held elections in 2024 saw the incumbent party lose seats or vote share from the last election The first time since


1905

(when records began)
that this level of
incumbent rejection has
occurred

Source: International Ideas, The 2024 Global Elections Super-Cycle; abc News, Democrats aren't alone — incumbent parties have lost elections all around the world; Financial Times, Democrats join 2024's graveyard of incumbents




Canada is no exception to this rule...



Source: CBC News Polling Tracker, last updated 23rd December 2024




Just for comparison, the UK



Source: BBC News Polling Tracker, data from 11th January 2020 to 3rd July 2024



What worries Canadians?



Source: Ipsos, fieldwork conducted 6th to 10th December 2024, 1,001 sample size of Canadian adults



Who worries Canadians?





Inflation/cost of living



Immigration



Housing



Economy



Taxes





Source: Ipsos, fieldwork conducted 6th to 10th December 2024, 1,001 sample size of Canadian adults



How we went about understanding the issue...

International students




What did Trudeau Tru-do?





- Those who feel there are "Too many" immigrants coming into Canada
- International post-secondary enrollements, by end of academic year



Source: **Enrollments data:** Postsecondary enrolments, by status of student in Canada, country of citizenship and gender, Statistique Canada, 20th November 2024; **"Too many immigrants" tracking data:** Government of Canada, IRCC, Deputy Minister, Transition Binder, 2024 - Public Opinion Research on Canadians' Attitudes Towards Immigration, January 2024



International Student Cap

- 2 year cap announced January 2024, extended in September 2024
- 2024: 35% down
- 2025: A further 10%
- 2026: Maintaining this level
- Part of a set of wider initiatives, including restrictions to the post-graduation work permit
- All with the aim of reducing proportion of Canada's population made up of temporary residents from 6.5% to 5% over next 3 years



What will happen?



Sources: **Tracking data:** Postsecondary enrolments, by status of student in Canada, country of citizenship and gender, Statistique Canada, 20th November 2024; **Government Projections:** Strengthening temporary residence programs for sustainable volumes, 18th September 2024; **ApplyBoard Projections:** Looking Ahead to 2025: Predictions for Canada's International Student Program, 10th September 2024



Is it working?

Purpose 1:

Improve public sentiment

Purpose 2:

Reduce immigration numbers



Will it work? In terms of public opinion...

52%

are in favour of the International Student cap


51%

feel programs like healthcare, agriculture and science should be exempt from the rule

Source: Navigator's research arm "Discover", fieldwork conducted March 2024, 1,500 sample size of Canadian adults



The bigger picture



Source: CBC News Polling Tracker, last updated 23rd December 2024



Is it working?

Purpose 1:

Improve public sentiment


Purpose 2:

Reduce immigration numbers



Is it working?

International migration components, Canada, all quarters, 2023 to 2024



Source: Statistique Canada, Quarterly demographic estimates, provinces and territories: Interactive dashboard, last modified 17th December 2024



But at what cost?

Universities

- Reliance on international fees
- Program closures
- Job losses
- Drop in application rates
- Concerns about international reputation

Students

- Less attractive
- No impact on current visas
- Restrictions to post-study work visas

Big issues

- Long term housing shortage persists
- Limited impact on rental prices too
- Workforce and labour shortages



What happens now?





Thank you

Thank you





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
The demographics of far-right support: a look at France and Great Britain

Ruby Cooper


2024: A Reflection on a year of elections

Wednesday 15th January 2025


The 2024 Election - France




The 2024 Election – England and Wales



The 2024 Elections






• Gender: higher support among men than women

Gender


• Age: highest support among 50 to 59-year-old age group

- Gender
- Age
- **Education:** lower support among those with higher educational qualifications

England & Wales: highest educational qualification




France: highest educational qualification




- Gender
- Age
- Education
- **Social Grade:** lower socio-economic circumstances are generally associated with higher support

France: social background



England and Wales: social grade



Individual-level polling data

- Gender
- Age
- Education
- Social Grade
- **Income:** lower household incomes generally associated with higher support


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Individual-level polling data


- Gender
- Age
- Education
- Social Grade
- Income
- Area type: higher support among those living in more rural or less dense areas

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England and Wales: area type



France: area type




Summary of polling data

- **Gender:** higher support among men than women
- Age: highest support among 50 to 59-year-old age group
- Education: lower support among those with higher educational qualifications
- **Social Grade:** lower socio-economic circumstances are generally associated with higher support
- Income: lower household incomes generally associated with higher support
- Area type: higher support among those living in more rural/less dense areas

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Constituency-level analysis

Reform UK vote share by occupation




Increase in Reform UK vote share in standard deviations associated with a standard deviation increase in share of active population in each profession

National Rally and allies vote share by occupation



Increase in National Rally vote share in standard deviations associated with a standard deviation increase in share of working/active adults in each profession

Reform UK vote share by post-18 education




% of working population with Level 4 qualifications or above

National Rally and allies vote share by post-18 education



% of working population with BAC+2 qualification or above

Party vote shares by post-18 education



% of working population with post-18 qualifications



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Sources

England & Wales

- Polling data: Deltapoll; Fieldwork: 14th June to 3rd July 2024; Sample: 7,051 adults in England and Wales, including 1,056 adults who said they plan to vote for Reform UK.
- Constituency election results: House of Commons Library
- Demographic data: Office for National Statistics, 2021 Census

France

- Polling data: <u>lpsos</u>; Fieldwork: 27th to 28th June 2024; Sample: 10,286 adults in France
- Constituency election results: Ministry of the Interior
- Demographic data: Insee, National Institute of Statistics

Panel Questions: Insights across the Western World

- ■Anouschka Rajah and Jenna Cunningham Research and Data Analysts (More in Common)
- Matthew Price Research Executive (DeltaPoll)
 - Rhiannon McQuone Policy Analyst (Public First)
 - Ruby Cooper Research Executive (DeltaPoll)

15th January 2025

BP (

2024: A Reflection on a Year of Elections

A British Polling Council: Next Gen Pollsters Event



15th January 2025